I
magine that it is the first day of the final semester of your undergraduate studies. You have just discovered that there is a perfect clash in your scheduling: The economics course and the psychology course you need to graduate are held at the same time. You decide you have no choice but to leave halfway through every economics lecture to dash to the psychology lecture. Then imagine that you are asked to take a single final exam on what you have learned. Your exam answers turn out to be thought-provoking and wide-ranging, more canny and interesting than those given by the more conventional students, full of good ideas-sometimes muddled and inconsistent-and broader than they are deep. Welcome to behavioral economics.
Although optimistic, Richard Thaler believes that most of economics is a mess. First, it treats people as though they are cold-blooded, shrewd optimizers (think Mr. Spock from Star Trek). Real humans, he argues, are routinely gripped by biases and errors of passion, and it is here that conventional economic theory goes wrong. Second, it has failed to predict important events like the financial crash of the 2000s. Third, he believes that economists should spend more time on observation and fact gathering. Here, the discipline of psychology is ahead of Thaler's curve.
If you buy this book, turn initially to the last page. Here, Thaler argues that most economists stubbornly cling "to an imaginary world" and that one day it will not be necessary to have a field called behavioral economics because all of economics will fall under that heading. He is largely right. However, given the verve with which he attacks traditional economics, it is not surprising to learn that Thaler's first published article on the topic was repeatedly turned down by prestigious journals, although it later went on to become hugely cited in a then-new and little-known journal (1).
According to Thaler, loss aversion-the idea that a loss hurts more than an equivalent gain-is "the single most powerful tool in the behavioral economist's arsenal." This is why, for example, firms on the verge of bankruptcy do not cut their workers' pay, even though wage cuts would arguably be the most rational choice, saving jobs and benefiting everyone involved. It explains why homeowners fruitlessly cling for years to the hope of selling their colonial for $300,000 rather than $280,000 and molds the behavior of scared but otherwise sensible stock market investors.
Thaler suggests that, in contrast to these real-life human behaviors, conventional economics equals optimization plus equilibrium, which, although not a meaningful equation, does actually convey the spirit of the underlying theory. He means by this that if we blend the assumption of rational decision-making (optimization) with that of stability (equilibrium), we end up with a calm, ordered world of the kind that is currently described in standard economics courses. Unfortunately, this is not the world we live in. Such an equation is hard to square with house-price booms and stock market crashes, for example.
Behavioral economics seeks to combine the best elements of the fields of psychology and economics. In his pithy and still-valuable introduction to the field in 1999 (2), Camerer wrote that to the typical economist, a theory is a body of mathematical tools, whereas to a psychologist, a theory is a verbal construct that organizes experimental regularity. Many psychologists use mathematical models, and I therefore do not agree with the details of this characterization, but there is something to the idea of unifying these two approaches.
If I were asked for criticisms, I might point gently to the fact that Thaler does not mention George Katona, a founding father of behavioral economics who worked three decades before Richard Thaler; nor are any of his 100 writings on the topic referenced [see selected publications (3, 4) ; see also (5) ]. Moreover, given that behavioral economics is meant to be the marriage of psychology and economics, one might wonder what psychologists will make of the fact that the references to economics journals vastly outnumber those to psychology journals. Apart from one brief nod to Dutch television, the book is also American-centered, in a way that may put off readers from the rest of the world's population.
Perhaps, finally, the book might have been even more cogent and rounded if it had explained that battles between scholars over a theoretical framework that does not fit the observed facts are normal in science. Viewed from a distance, nothing unusual is going on in modern economics. It is bending to the data. The tetchiness, howls, and misbehavior of those whose ideas are out of date are just what has been happening for centuries in other disciplines. Scientific progress hurts.
